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A qualitative investigation of the safety
culture of two contrasting organisations
was undertaken. The research sought to
identify categories and themes in the data
that highlighted similarities and differences
in salient safety issues for employees from
the two organisations. The participants
were 131 employees attending safety
training sessions in a large national retail
organisation and a heavy manufacturing
organisation. Unobtrusive observation was
used to collect data during the safety
training sessions. Thematic analysis was
used to identify emergent categories and
themes from the data. Ten broad
categories with relevant themes were
identified and provided some insight into
the safety culture of the two organisations,
with both similarities and differences being
evident. Participants from both
organisations mentioned management
issues in relation to safety, discussed the
impact of employee risk-taking behaviour
on safety, made reference to a blame
culture, and raised integrity issues
regarding safety. For the manufacturing
organisation, a number of themes focused
on contractor issues, while in the retail
organisation, several themes highlighted
differences in safety attitudes between
head office and store-level employees.
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Introduction
In the safety literature, the distinction between
safety culture and safety climate is not always clear.
Many safety culture definitions reflect
anthropological origins of the construct by referring
to collectively held safety values and beliefs.
However, some definitions of safety culture also
refer to safety attitudes, perceptions and behaviour,
concepts that are more traditionally associated with
climate. Similarly, some safety climate definitions
appear to reflect a collective aspect more often
associated with culture, using terms such as shared
or molar, rather than individual-level aspects
typically espoused in safety climate studies.
Inconsistencies in respective descriptions of safety
culture and safety climate appear to be related to
two areas: a group-level versus an individual-level
focus; and reference to beliefs, attitudes and
perceptions.
The respective historical roots of safety culture and
safety climate suggest that safety culture should be
measured using descriptive qualitative methods,
such as observation, focus groups, interviews and
case studies, while safety climate should be measured
quantitatively using standardised procedures that
attempt to score the construct numerically.
However, it appears that studies using qualitative
techniques to tap the underlying values and
assumptions thought to reflect safety culture are
rare, with most research using quantitative survey
methodology. Therefore, according to the historical
definitions of these constructs, most research
appears to assess safety climate, rather than safety
culture.
Some researchers argue the benefits of combining
qualitative and quantitative techniques to gain a
more comprehensive understanding of safety in an
organisation. l Combining qualitative and
quantitative methods, such as case studies, focus
groups and surveys, can provide a holistic view of
safety through an evaluation of organisational
structure, function and behaviour. 2,3 Mearns and
Flin have argued that quantitative methods only
scratch the surface with regard to attitudes and
perceptions of safety, and that researchers need to
become part of an organisation in order to
understand and observe its culture, behaviour and
interactions of those within it.4
Empirical assessment of safety climate can generally
be categorised as content-based or evaluation-type
research. Content-based research has focused on
four main areas: developing scales to measure safety
climate; determining the underlying dimensions of
these constructs; determining the nature of the
climate for specific groups; and comparing the safety
perceptions of different employee groups.
Evaluation-type research has investigated
relationships between safety climate and antecedent
or outcome variables.
Quantitative attempts to identify underlying
dimensions of safety climate have yielded little
consensus, with the number of identified
dimensions ranging from two to 19.5,6 A review of
18 safety climate scales found that three dimensions
were typically used to assess safety climate
(appearing in more than two-thirds of the scales):
management, risk, and safety system.? The
management theme comprised perceptions of
management attitudes and behaviour in relation to
safety; the risk theme included risk-taking behaviour
and perceptions of hazards and risks; and the safety
system theme included safety policies, procedures
and equipment. A similar review of 15 studies also
identified management, risk, and safety
arrangements as frequently-measured safety climate
dimensions. 8 A more recent review of 12 safety
climate studies in the health care sector identified
four core elements of safety climate: management
commitment to safety, supervisor commitment to
safety, safety systems, and work pressure.9 Two of
these dimensions, namely, management
commitment to safety and safety systems,
corresponded with frequently measured dimensions
identified in the earlier reviews.
Qualitative approaches to explore employee
perceptions of safety are not common, yet
qualitative research can yield rich, detailed, valid
data that provide contextual understanding of
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behaviour and allows investigators to examine
individuals' perspectives in detail. 10 Qualitative
exploration of a subject is also a commonly used
method for developing a quantitative survey
instrument.IO,11 Of the few existing qualitative
studies, most are content-based, using interview or
focus group data to compare safety perceptions of
different groups of employees or to generate items
for scale developmentY,l2,13 Qualitative evaluation-
type studies are particularly rare, despite the view
that this is the most effective way of understanding
the factors that might influence safety attitudes and
behaviourY Three evaluation studies have used
interviews to investigate factors influencing risk
and/or unsafe behaviour at work. 14 16
The present study helps to redress the lack of
qualitative research in the safety culture and safety
climate literature. The primary aim of this study was
to provide insight into the safety culture of two
contrasting organisations by identifYing and
exploring categories and themes in the data that
highlighted similarities and differences in salient
safety issues for employees.
Method
Participants
The participants were 131 skilled workers,
supervisors and middle managers (110 males, 21
females). Potential participants were identified on
the basis of attendance at pre-scheduled safety
training sessions in two organisations in Australia: a
large national retail organisation and a heavy
manufacturing organisation. Eighty-two participants
(65 males, 17 females) were from the retail
organisation and most held supervisory or middle-
management positions. Forty-nine participants (45
males, 4 females) were from the manufacturing
organisation and most were highly skilled workers,
including two supervisors.
Rationale and procedure
To minimise the effects of reactivity on the data and
to permit naturalistic investigation, unobtrusive
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observation was selected as the data collection
method. 17 Of particular interest were the
participants' views of safety arising from discussions
during the safety training sessions, which could
provide insight into the safety culture of the two
organisations. The cross-sectional participant sample
(consisting of skilled workers, supervisors and
middle managers) also meant that a wide range of
employee safety perceptions could be obtained. The
unobtrusive observational methodology was
deemed to be the least disruptive to the work
environment, as well as being the most cost-
effective, in that data could be collected without
accessing additional employee time.
All of the safety training sessions were interactive,
with employees being encouraged to express their
views on safety. Seven one-day safety training
sessions attended by different groups of employees
were observed (four in the retail organisation and
three in the manufacturing organisation), equating
to 56 hours of observation. The researcher was
introduced at the beginning of each session, and
consent to observe and record the proceedings via
note taking was obtained. Only employee
interactions were of interest to the researcher, and
note taking mainly excluded comments made by
trainers when these took place during the free flow
of comments and discussions about safety.
Interruptions were also ignored if they interfered
with the opinions being voiced by participants.
Continuous unstructured observations of employee
behaviour and interactions were made throughout
each training session, with the researcher attempting
to record as many employee comments as possible
using a personal form of shorthand. No comments
were made directly to the researcher, and the
recorded comments were part of the conversations
which occurred during the training sessions. At the
end of each training session, the notes were
expanded and typed into transcripts.
Analysis
The qualitative computer program NVivo 2.0 was
used to develop a thematic analysis of the seven
transcripts. An inductive approach was used, with
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identified categories and themes emerging from the
data. The transcripts were read several times and a
list of broad categories was developed and expanded
as the analysis progressed. The transcripts were
initially coded using 18 broad categories identified
in the data. When assigning data to categories, a
"unit of meaning" was selected as the unit of
coding. 18 A unit of meaning is conveyed by content
rather than form. Since participants can express ideas
succinctly or expansively, consideration is not given
to the number of words but to the meaning
conveyed. Once the transcripts had been coded as
broad categories, text within the categories was
retrieved and read to identifY themes within the
categories.
To establish sufficient reliability to proceed with the
analysis and interpretation of the data, the double
coding method was adopted. 19 A second researcher
who was familiar with the aims and objectives of the
research coded a random sample of 30% of the data.
Discussions were then held between the two
researchers to reach agreement over the fInal
categories and themes. Refinement of an initial 18
categories (whereby categories were expanded,
combined or renamed) resulted in 10 broad
categories being established. To establish inter-rater
reliability of coding according to the 10 broad
categories, a third researcher who was naIve to the
aims of the study independently categorised a
random sample of 30% of the data. Inter-rater
reliability was established at greater than 80%.
Analysis of the coded text concentrated on
similarities and differences between the retail and
manufacturing organisations in terms of the
categories and themes generated.
Results
The 10 broad categories with relevant themes
identified in the data are displayed in Table 1.
Although most categories were pertinent to both
organisations, in some instances, themes within the
categories were more relevant to one organisation
than the other. The data are reported descriptively
according to categories and relevance of themes for
the two organisations. The two organisations are
identified as manufacturing (M) and retail (R).
Knowledge and training
Resource issues in relation to training
Resource issues were of greater importance to
participants from the retail organisation than to
those from the manufacturing organisation. In
particular, employees from the retail organisation
appeared to be concerned about their ability to
provide adequate safety training to staff without the
appropriate resources:
"Our ability to back up information with
resources is a problem. We employ a lot of
casuals, but we do not provide appropriate
training to them. Instead, we rely on the
immediate supervisor to convey the safety
message." (R)
Creating awareness about safety
For the manufacturing organisation, comments
relating to safety awareness mainly concerned
contractors. There seemed to be a feeling that,
because contractors worked in many organisations,
each having their own safety policies and
procedures, contractors' safety awareness may
become diminished over time. For example:
"With contractors, they move from one
organisation to another. They have to sit
through numerous inductions. After a while, I
think it becomes too much and they probably
do not take it in." (M)
In the retail organisation, employees highlighted the
need for head office departments to be aware of
safety issues at the store level, as this could have an
impact on business practices:
"I work in the furniture buying office and our
buyers do not have any basic information
regarding how much an individual can lift.
This would affect our buying and ordering
system." (R)
204 J Occup Health Safety - Aust NZ 2008, 24(3): 201-212
Walker
TABLE 1
Final categories and themes from the thematic analysis
Category Themes within categories
Knowledge and training
Managing safety
Communication
Individual responsibility
Priority of safety
Employee welfare
Safety policies and procedures
Employee behaviour
Integrity
Blame
Resource issues in relation to training; creating awareness about safety
Awareness of employees' work environment and the risks faced; reactions to
safety incidents, hazards, issues and problems; leading by example;
commitment to safety programs, safety resources and hazard elimination
Communicating safety information; communicating with others, for example,
other sites/departments; providing feedback and positive reinforcement
Attitudes to safety; taking ownership of safety
Existing culture or behaviour, for example, taking shortcuts due to "being
busy"; management pressures
Concern for employees, for example, not harming, mindful of feelings and
treatment of employees; managing injured employees
Incident reporting; awareness of policies and procedures
Taking risks or shortcuts; impact of behaviour on others; use of personal
protective equipment (PPE)
Reporting incidents honestly
Emphasis on individual fault rather than system fault
Managing safety
Awareness of employees' work
environment and risks faced
Employees in both the retail and manufacturing
organisations seemed to feel that head office staff
and/or managers lacked awareness of the risks faced
by employees in their normal work environment:
"No one visits the actual stores to see what the
actual problems at ground level are. Until this
happens, nothing will change." (R)
"Do managers ever go out and work on the
floor to see what's actually happening out there
and see what the injuries and risks ard" (M)
Reactions to safety incidents, hazards,
issues and problems
In the retail organisation, employees remarked that
a proactive, rather than a reactive, approach to safety
might improve the organisation's overall safety
statistics, for example:
"That's our problem, we're reactive rather than
proactive. Unless we become proactive, we
cannot achieve the overall aim." (R)
Retail employees also indicated that there was a lack
of consistency in relation to safety, with safety only
being an issue for management once a major
incident had occurred. As one employee noted:
"When there are no deaths or serious injuries,
then safety is not on the agenda. Once this
happens, then suddenly safety is on the agenda.
There is no consistency." (R)
In the manufacturing organisation, employees
considered management reactions to safety incidents
as unnecessarily negative and exaggerated. These
reactions sometimes led to blanket rules being
implemented that were impractical and regarded as
a form of reproach rather than an attempt to solve
the issue at hand:
"It happens here time and time again,
management react to accidents by punishing the
whole workforce." (M)
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Leading by example
This theme was of particular relevance to the retail
organisation. Employees remarked that managers
needed to be proactive and to lead by example when
encouraging staff to consider safety as an important
workplace issue. For example, it was stated that
managers should:
"Practice what they preach and follow up on
safety matters." (R)
Commitment to safety programs, safety
resources and hazard elimination
Employees in both the retail and manufacturing
organisations appeared sceptical about
management's commitment to safety. Participants
seemed to believe that, in many instances, cost
determined the outcome of safety issues:
"It seems that when it gets to a certain dollar
figure, then suddenly it's not so important
because the problem is too expensive to fix." (R)
"About five years ago, we identified five areas
where accidents continually happen but
management have told us that there's no money
to spend to fix the problem." (M)
Employees from the retail organisation also
expressed frustration about identified risks and
hazards not being acted on by management. For
instance:
"Sometimes we have to reflect on whether safety
is really one ofthe four pillars of the organisation
because sometimes you identifY safety issues and
pass them on to your line manager but they
don't do anything about it." (R)
Employees from the manufacturing organisation
indicated that management support for safety
programs was inconsistent:
"We can see from the shop floor that
management are big on things like this safety
program for a few months, but then they lose
interest." (M)
Communication
Communicating safety information
In the retail organisation, some employees remarked
that injuries might be prevented if there were better
processes in place for communicating safety-related
information. As one employee noted:
"Often one person knows about the hazard and
will inform a local group around them so they
know to avoid the hazard. But they do not
communicate the hazard further than that and
then someone from outside the local group gets
injured." (R)
In the manufacturing organisation, employees also
acknowledged that safety-related information was
being communicated. However, as some employees
pointed out, the nature of the information being
communicated was not always understood:
"The lost-time Injury (LTI) days are
standardised and it's difficult for the employees
to understand. The guys on the floor would like
to know what the actual LTI days are." (M)
Communicating with others
Communicating with others held particular
meaning for the retail organisation. Employees
seemed to think that internal communication
processes between departments and/or stores could
be improved, leading to better outcomes for the
organisation as a whole:
"We're doing the incident report, risk
assessment and follow up, so it seems logical that
we should be involved in the claim. We see the
outcome of the claim, but it's always after the
event." (R)
Providing feedback and positive
reinforcement
Employees from both organisations appeared to
think that feedback and positive reinforcement were
integral to a safety management system. In
particular, employees from the retail organisation
indicated that positive reinforcement was lacking,
for example:
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"We need reinforcement of safety. Usually after
these type of sessions, it's an issue for a short
while and then we forget about it." (R)
Employees from the manufacturing organisation
remarked that positive reinforcement of desired
safety behaviour should be extended to contractors:
"I don't think there is enough positive feedback
regarding safety and PPE use in the workplace.
For example, at shutdown, the contractors used
PPE, but no one commented on this. They only
focused on the negative, what was not done."
(M)
Individual responsibility
Attitudes to safety
In the retail organisation, there appeared to be a
realisation that employees working in head office
departments can have an impact on safety matters.
Some head office retail employees acknowledged
that they had not traditionally seen safety as an issue
for them, but that it was more of a concern at the
store level, for example:
"We do not actually see ourselves as part of the
safety chain, yet we can have an impact on safety
in terms of the products we buy, how they're
packaged, their weight and so forth." (R)
Attitudes to safety III the manufacturing
organisation appeared to contemplate the difference
in attitudes between contractors and permanent
employees, as is evident in the following comment:
"I was originally a contractor, now I'm a
permanent. I think my safety is better as a
permanent because as a contractor you can work
five to six nights in a row, so you become tired.
I also think contractors can be more complacent
about safety." (M)
Taking ownership of safety
Employees from both organisations seemed to agree
that safety was everyone's responsibility. From
participants based in the retail organisation, there
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was particular emphasis on ensuring that safety
accountability was shared by all staff
"The safety accountability must be shared. It's
not just the responsibility of the OHS officer.
The thinking was that 'they can look after this,
it's a safety thing'. We want to move away from
this type of thinking and think that safety is
everyone's responsibility." (R)
On the other hand, in the manufacturing
organisation, it was noted that employees took
particular care when working in high-risk situations,
for instance:
"It seems to me that the higher the risk or more
dangerous the job, the less accidents happen
because people take more care." (M)
Priority of safety
Existing culture or behaviour
In both organisations, employees acknowledged
that the existing culture of "doing everything
quickly" sometimes contravened safety policies and
procedures:
"It's a matter of trying to change the culture.
It's always been 'do this quickly'. Now we need
to communicate the change, that is, 'Do this
safely and follow the correct procedures'." (R)
"I think it's part of our culture where the idea is
to get the job done quickly, but not necessarily
following the housekeeping rules." (M)
Management pressures
Management pressures were particularly relevant to
the manufacturing organisation. Employees
indicated that safety was at times compromised
because of management pressures to meet
production deadlines, as one participant observed:
"The job on the filter boxes takes a long time
but we're constantly questioned by management
about why we're taking so long when they've
got 300 items to go out and they're behind on
their production deadlines." (M)
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Employee welfare
Concern for employees
In the retail organisation in particular, employees
expressed concern about the number of people
being injured in the workplace. These participants
seemed to think that as a "low-risk" industry, their
injury rates were too high and needed to be
reduced:
"I don't think it matters whether we compare
with other industries or not, what matters is that
we do not injure our people. The idea is to
reduce our injuries. As a retailer, we have higher
injury stats than some very heavy and risky
industries and it's ridiculous." (R)
Managing injured employees
There appeared to be a feeling among employees
from both organisations that, when an injury
occurred, attention was focused on the injury
process and the subsequent effect on the
organisation, rather than taking an interest in the
injured person. For example:
"We tend to ostracise people who are injured.
We seem to be more concerned with the injury
process than with the person who has injured
themselves because we're busy, short of
resources, etc. We should show more concern."
(R)
"You get dragged from the hospital to the
medical centre for a few hours, then
management say, 'He's here now, you can take
him home'. This results in no lost time for the
company. Are they looking after work or are
they worried about the injured personr" (M)
Employees from the retail organisation remarked
that it was important for injured staff to know that
the organisation cared about them and would
endeavour to accommodate them in the workplace:
"After an injury occurs, some employees feel
uncertain about what happens next and about
returning to work and the return-to-work
process. We need to reassure employees about
other duties that can be done and what the
process involves." (R)
Safety policies and procedures
Incident reporting
Some employees from the retail organisation were of
the opinion that, if they encouraged staff to report
safety incidents, including "near-miss" incidents,
this would have a negative impact on the
organisation's safety statistics:
"Is it possible that, in the short term, our injury
stats may actually rise because of more exposure
to safety issues~ Because some people may not
have reported injuries in the past but now,
because they're more aware of the processes,
they will." (R)
Employees from the manufacturing organisation, on
the other hand, acknowledged that incident
reporting was a proactive measure in preventing
injuries. For example, one employee gave an
account of a near-miss incident in which he was
involved. When the employee said that he did not
complete an incident form, other employees
responded with:
"Whyr Now no one knows about the risk." (M)
Awareness of policies and procedures
Employees from the retail organisation especially
wanted reassurance that the new policies and
procedures being implemented would be explicit to
ensure that correct procedures were carried out:
"When an incident occurs, you may not be
thinking clearly, therefore it would be helpful to
have a flowchart to follow to ensure everything
is actioned correctly." (R)
Employee behaviour
Taking risks or shortcuts
In both the retail and manufacturing organisations,
employees conceded that human behaviour was
unpredictable. At times, staff took risks and
shortcuts that compromised their safety or the safety
of others. For instance, it was remarked that:
"The 'tag it out of service' procedure I think is
dangerous because people will look at it and
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decide that it looks OK and will ignore the tag
and use the piece of equipment. You're dealing
with people and they sometimes ignore the
rules." (R)
"I've seen this happen on our shift, especially
when the end of shift is near. We take off the pit
covers, but don't get the barricades because it
would take another half hour to get them. So we
just work without them. We're rushing and
trying to get finished so we can go home but
really we're not working safely." (M)
Impact of behaviour on others
The impact of behaviour on others held particular
relevance for the manufacturing organisation.
Employees observed that injuries could be reduced
if everyone took more care in following basic
housekeeping rules:
"We've had heaps of injuries because of
housekeeping issues, for example, guys stepping
onto spacers when getting off the forklift
trucks." (M)
Use ofPPE
In the retail organisation, there seemed to be a
feeling that inappropriate use of PPE led to injuries.
It was maintained that these injuries could be
prevented if people used equipment that was
suitable to the task:
"There is inappropriate use of equipment, for
example, knives for cutting instead of scissors."
(R)
Employees from the manufacturing organisation
remarked that there was not a problem with PPE
use among permanent staff. However, it was felt
that contractors sometimes breached PPE
regulations:
"Contractors can be a problem regarding safety
here because different companies have different
rules regarding safety. For example, they do not
have to wear safety glasses in one organisation,
and then they think they do not have to wear
safety glasses here either."(M)
Walker
Integrity
Reporting incidents honestly
Employees from both the retail and manufacturing
organisations seemed to believe that LTI data were
not always reported honestly. There appeared to be
a feeling that management misrepresented the
numbers in order to show the particular workplace
in a positive manner with regard to injuries:
"The LTI data is corrupt. We're still looking at
ours and trying to work out what it really is." (R)
"A lot of lost work days are not recorded, they
are fudged. Management juggle the books to
make us look good." (M)
In the retail organisation, questions were raised
about employee integrity with regard to time off
work for injuries. Some implied that employees
sometimes took advantage of the situation, having
more time off than was actually required:
"What about injuries that occurred five to seven
years ago~ All our lost time now is from these
very old injuries and every now and then the
person takes three to five days off as a result of
these old injuries. I have one employee who has
an injury that is 16 years old." (R)
Blame
Emphasis on individual fault rather than
system fault
In both organisations, employees referred to the
existence of a blame culture - particularly in
relation to safety incidents, with individuals usually
being blamed for these incidents. The following
comments represent employee perceptions:
"Our investigation procedures need work. We're
really good at blaming others." (R)
"The company wanted to implement a new
procedure and we identified the reasons why this
procedure could be dangerous in certain
situations. Yet they still implemented the
procedure because really the new procedure was
about being able to blame someone when
something happens." (M)
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Discussion
Although the data represent a perspective on safety
that is limited by the size and composition of the
samples, the categories and themes identified provide
some insight into the safety culture of these two
organisations, with both similarities and differences
being evident. Employees from both organisations
mentioned management issues in relation to safety,
discussed the impact of employee risk-taking
behaviour on safety, made reference to a blame
culture, and raised integrity issues regarding safety.
For participants from the manufacturing organisation,
a number of themes focused on contractor issues,
while in the retail organisation, several themes
highlighted differences in safety attitudes between
head office and store-level employees.
The emerging themes in the present study, found to
be similarly important for participants from both
organisations, are consistent with underlying
dimensions typically used to assess safety climate.
Specifically, two of the three themes identified by
Flin et al and Guldenmund as frequently measured
safety climate dimensions emerged as important
issues for participants from the two organisations,
namely, management and risk. 7,s These findings
provide further support for the primacy of these
dimensions in safety culture/climate research.
Participants from both organisations seemed to have
a negative view of how safety was being managed.
They remarked that managers did not regularly visit
employees at "ground level" and therefore lacked
understanding of the hazards and risks faced by
employees in their normal working environment.
They also appeared to be sceptical about
management's commitment to safety. In particular,
participants mentioned that managers displayed
inconsistent support for safety. They believed that
safety was not always a priority and instead
depended on cost, the nature ofsafety incidents, and
how recently these incidents had occurred. Some
employees expressed the view that managers
favoured money and processes over people. This
negative view held by employees towards managers
and safety management in these two organisations
may stem from a lack of understanding about the
safety management process.
Negative perceptions regarding safety management
could also indicate a poor safety culture in these
organisations. It has been found that, when
perceived safety culture is poor, there is a significant
difference in managers' and employees' perceptions
of safety.20 In particular, it was found that managers
and employees each believed that the other group
was responsible for safety, and the two groups
disagreed about the extent to which employees
engaged in safe work behaviour. As safety culture
improved, perceptions of managers and employees'
in relation to safety seemed to converge. In the
present study, finger-pointing and blame attribution
between managers and employees appeared to be a
consequence of a poor safety culture. Participants
appeared to engage in some level of finger-pointing
at senior managers, criticising how safety was
managed and possibly indicating a poor safety
culture in both organisations.
Participants from both organisations acknowledged
that, at times, employee behaviour compromised
safety. Essentially, this related to a tendency for
employees to take shortcuts during work processes
or to ignore certain safety policies and/or
procedures. Participants seemed to suggest that the
reason for this risk-taking behaviour was because of
the existing culture to "do everything quickly", or
because of management pressures to meet work
demands.
An alternative explanation is that employee risk-
taking behaviour could indicate an underlying
optimistic bias, that is, a tendency for individuals to
underestimate their degree of personal risk
associated with future life events compared with
others.21 There is evidence that the optimistic bias
phenomenon can increase risk-taking behaviour
when driving, and that optimistic bias may be a
factor in risk-taking behaviour at work. 15,22,23
However, no current research links occupational
injury risk with optimistic bias. The extent to which
optimistic bias might influence workplace risk-
taking behaviour merits further investigation.
Participants from both organisations also alluded to
the existence of a blame culture in relation to safety
incidents. Several participants mentioned a tendency
to blame others, while some expressed apprehension
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bo t being blamed. A blame culture could indicateaU, h' 1r working relatIOns Ip among emp oyees or~en employees and mana?ement,. possibly
I ding to suspicion and mIstrust m these
::ganisations.. It r.night also mean that, in the p~st,
safety investigations have focused on findmg
meone to blame, leaving employees unconvinced
SObout the authenticity of these processes. A blame~ulture can result in a range of negative
consequences for an organisation, including:
unwillingness to report safety incidents and near
misses for fear of retribution; deteriorating
relationships between management and employees;
anon-productive working environment; and erosion
of trust. 20,24-27
Participants from both organisations raised the issue
of integrity in relation to safety statistics. Employees
seemed to think that LTI data were not being
reported accurately and honestly, with the
organisations representing a more positive view of
injury statistics than was realistic. This disbelief of
injury statistics may reflect a lack of understanding
by participants about safety statistics in general.
It may also suggest a lack of communication
between senior management and employees in
relation to injury statistics. Questions and comments
by participants from the retail organisation seemed
to indicate that many did not know how LTI days
were calculated. A comment from a manufacturing
organisation participant about LTI days being
standardised and workers wanting to know what the
"actual" days were suggests a lack of understanding
or poor communication.
In the manufacturing organisation, contractor issues
appeared to be a recurring subject in relation to
various categories and themes. Participants made
frequent reference to contractors' safety attitudes
and behaviour, implying that contractors were less
committed to safety than permanent employees.
This perception about contractors' safety attitudes
and behaviour may indicate an in-group-out-group
bias, with employees displaying in-group favouritism
towards themselves ("We're committed to safety")
and an out-group bias towards contractors
("They're not as committed as we are"). Repeated
reference to contractors' alleged inferior safety
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attitudes and behaviour on the part of employees
could also be indicative of a blame culture or
scapegoating. Blame and scapegoating are defence
mechanisms that individuals may use to redirect
accountability and responsibility away from
themselves. 26,lR In this instance, to protect
themselves from possible blame regarding safety
incidents, employees might use contractors as a
scapegoat when safety procedures have not been
followed,
In the retail organisation, a common topic in
relation to the various categories and themes was to
compare perceptions of safety at store-level and
perceptions of safety in head office departments.
Employees commented on the difference in safety
attitudes between people undertaking administrative
and managerial work in head office departments and
those involved in goods handling in stores, There
was general agreement that head office employees
seemed more complacent about safety. Some
participants even suggested that head office
employees did not consider themselves to be part of
the safety network. The perceived difference in
safety attitudes between head office employees and
those working in stores may indicate a mutual lack
of awareness about the others' working
environment. This in turn may be associated with a
general communication problem in the retail
organisation, whereby employees from one site or
department may lack opportunities to interact and
discuss safety issues with employees from other sites
or departments.
The two organisations participating in this study can
be considered to be very different in terms of level
of workplace risk. The nature of the work
environment in the manufacturing organisation
meant that employees were generally at higher risk
of injury than employees in the retail organisation,
although some divisions of the retail organisation
could be considered as a higher risk, for example,
the logistics department. Despite these differences
in terms of workplace risk, it was evident from the
data that employees in both organisations thought
and talked about safety in similar ways, resulting in
comparable categories and themes to describe the
safety culture of their respective organisations.
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Differences that were apparent between participants
from these organisations seemed to be related to
distinct characteristics of each organisation, rather
than differences in employee attitudes to safety or
perceptions of safety across the two organisations.
This study has both strengths and limitations. The
unobtrusive observational methodology used to
collect data meant that the researcher had no direct
influence over the type of safety issues discussed or
how employees spoke about these issues. However,
employees from both organisations appeared to
perceive safety issues in similar ways. The presence of
a researcher who recorded conversations using note
taking could have cued participants' comments.
However, while participants were aware that a
researcher was recording conversations about safety,
these conversations were driven by the context of
the safety training sessions and discussions arising
from facilitator and!or trainee questions, and not by
researcher input. While video- or tape-recording the
training sessions may have produced more accurate
transcripts of the safety conversations, these tools
might have been perceived as more intrusive and
had a greater impact on the naturalistic interactions.
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